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GREATER EFFICIENCY OR HIGHER CONSUMER
RATES? FCC PREEMPTION OF STATE DEPRECIATION
METHODS FOR TELEPHONE COMPANIES IN VIRGINIA
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION v. FCC
Through the Communications Act of 1934, Congress created the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC)' to consolidate the federal government's
regulatory control over telephone, telegraph, and wireless radio companies. 2
Congress provided the FCC with regulatory powers over interstate telephone
service and reserved to state regulatory commissions powers over intrastate
telephone service. 3 For nearly four decades, the FCC regarded accounting
and depreciation practices 4 for intrastate telephone service as within the
jurisdiction of state regulatory commissions. 5 The concept of depreciation
1. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§151-609 1982). In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress stated
that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) should make available an efficient
nationwide wire and radio communications service at reasonable cost to consumers. Id. at §
151. Congress stated that the Communications Act would consolidate and centralize authority
over the nation's communications network within the FCC. Id. Congress specifically granted
the FCC authority over interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication. Id.
Congress empowered the FCC to prescribe reasonable rates and charges for telephone and wire
communication interstate service. Id. at § 205. The Communications Act also provided the FCC
with the authority to control accounting and depreciation methods used by carriers providing
interstate telephone service. Id. at § 220. See generally B. ScHwARTz, THE ECONomc REGULATON
OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 2373 (1973) (describing legislative history of the Communications
Act); T. BERRY, COMMNICATIONS By W.iE AND RADIo, THE COMmuNICAnONs ACT, 1-31 (1937)
(reviewing statutory language of the Communications Act).
2. S. Doc. No. 144, 73rd Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1934). President Franklin Roosevelt urged
the adoption of the Communications Act to consolidate the authority split between the Federal
Radio Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission. Id. Roosevelt stated that for the
sake of clarity, services known as utilities should be divided into three fields and governed by
different federal agencies. Id. Roosevelt noted that the Interstate Commerce Commission had
jurisdiction over transportation, and the Federal Power Commission had authority over the
development and transmission of electric power. Id. Roosevelt stated that no single federal
agency possessed broad authority to address uniformly communications needs and problems,
and that the FCC would fill that void. Id. Roosevelt suggested that Congress provide the FCC
with authority over all services utilizing or using wire, cables, or radio as a medium of
transmission, and with full power to investigate and study the business of existing communica-
tions companies. Id.
3. See 47 U.S.C. § 220(h) (1982) (excepting state carriers subject to state regulation from
FCC prescription of accounting and depreciation methods); 47 U.S.C. § 221(b) (forbidding
FCC jurisdiction with respect to charges, classifications, practices, 'services or facilities for
intrastate service regulated by state commissions); 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (forbidding FCC from
asserting jurisdiction with respect to carriers engaged in interstate service solely through physical
connection with another independent carrier).
4. See infra note 6 (discussing depreciation purposes under Internal Revenue Code).
5. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 89 F.C.C.2d 1094, 1106 (April 15, 1982). The FCC
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measures the loss of service value due to wear and tear or obsolesence of a
capital asset over time.6 Telephone companies or carriers apply a depreciation
deduction for tax purposes to each individual year in which an asset is in
service. 7 Through use of depreciation deductions, carriers recover capital
expended on assets while the asset continues to serve the customers.a The
FCC has stated that depreciation and accounting measures affect pricing and
ratemaking decisions because carriers may consider depreciation deductions
as an expense to be recouped from consumers through higher rates.9
Since 1983, the FCC has reversed its position on preemption of state-set
depreciation rates and now requires that state regulatory commissions con-
trolling intrastate telephone service follow the FCC's accounting and depre-
ciation schedules.10 The FCC currently requires state regulatory commissions
to refrain from using accounting and depreciation methods inconsistent with
stated in the 1982 Order that state regulatory commissions have a right to depart from FCC-
recommended accounting and depreciation rules. Id. The FCC acknowledged that Congress did
not intend to coerce any state commission into using ratemaking methods deemed unacceptable
by the state commission. Id.
6. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (1984). Section 167(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows as a
depreciation deduction a reasonable amount for the exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence
of property used in business. Id.; United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 262 (1930).
In United Railways, the United States Supreme court described depreciation as an accounting
device designed to serve three purposes. Id. at 264. First, depreciation preserves the integrity of
the investment. Id. Secondly, depreciation equitably allocates over the course of asset service
life the original investment cost less the estimated salvage value. Id. Third, depreciation provides
a clearer picture of the actual financial status of a company during the year's operation, because
depreciation reflects the decrease in value of assets. Id. See generally Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 167 (1934) (describing depreciation as decrease in value of an asset that
is not restored by maintenance).
7. See I.R.C. § 167(m)(1) (1984). Section 167(m)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code allows
a reasonable depreciation deduction for an asset in a given taxable year that reflects the
anticipated useful life of an asset. Id.
8. Id. The reasonable allowance for depreciation under § 167(m)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code allows a carrier to recover the amount originally invested in an asset by deducting
that amount during the period constituting the asset's service life. See id.
9. 83 F.C.C.2d 267, 272 (1980) (depreciation schedules determine how much depreciation
reserve remains in rate base and how much must be paid as return on investment to investors);
see C. Wmcox, PUBLIC Poucms TowARD BusnEss 563 (1960). Depreciation deductions for tax
purposes become depreciation expenses charged to consumers in order to provide funds for the
replacement value of an asset. Id. The depreciation expense allows carriers to charge consumers
fqr the replacement of assets as a cost of consumer service. Id., see E. BRIGHAM & J. PAPPAS,
LIBERALIZED DEPRECIATION AND THE COST OF CAPrrAL 26 (1970) (utility customers must pay
rates to cover depreciation expenses included in operating costs); see also infra note 180
(describing relationship between depreciation practices and rate increases).
10. 92 F.C.C.2d 864, 869 (January 6, 1983). In the 1983 depreciation order, the FCC
determined that § 220(b) of the Communications Act allows FCC preemption of state accounting
and depreciation methods. Id. at 869. The FCC stated that § 220(b) of the Communications
Act did not distinguish between interstate and intrastate property for purposes of depreciation,
and that, consequently, Congress intended no such distinction. Id. The FCC further held that,
even if § 220(b) does not preempt the authority of state commissions, the FCC may preempt in
order to promote federal policies and objectives. Id. at 875. Section 220(b) states that the FCC
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the FCC-prescribed methods." In justifying its new position on depreciation,
the FCC has stated that the statutory language and legislative history of the
Communications Act of 1934 allow federal preemption of inconsistent state
accounting and depreciation methods.12 In the alternative, the FCC has
argued that federal preemption is necessary to further the goals and policies
of the FCC as outlined by Congress. 3 The goals and policies cited by the
FCC include providing efficient and modern communications service at
reasonable cost.'
4
A federal regulatory agency derives the authority to preempt state
regulations from the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution'" as
shall define certain classes of property for depreciation purposes, and shall set the depreciation
percentages for such charges. 47 U.S.C. § 220(b). Section 220(b) applies to carriers subject to
FCC jurisdiction, or carriers engaged in interstate telephone service. See 47 U.S.C. § 220(a).
The FCC's 1983 order reversed another FCC order issued only nine months earlier which
recognized state authority to set depreciation methods other than those recommended by the
FCC. 89 F.C.C.2d 1094, 1107 (April 27, 1982). In the 1982 order, the FCC expressly recognized
the right of state commissions to depart from FCC accounting and depreciation methods. Id.
at 1107. The FCC Stated that § 220 of the Communications Act supports state commissions by
precluding FCC jurisdiction over charges, practices, methods, or facilities of carriers providing
intrastate telephone service regulated by state commissions. Id. at 1108; see 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)
(prohibiting FCC jurisdiction over intrastate service). In the 1982 order, the FCC stated that
the right of state commissioners to set depreciation and ratemaking methods had been recognized
by the FCC for four decades. 89 F.C.C.2d at 1098, 1108. The FCC stated that Congress did
not intend for the FCC to preempt state ratemaking methods unless those methods threatened
important interests of national communications policy. Id. at 1108. The FCC concluded that
requiring carriers to maintain additional records for intrastate ratemaking purposes would not
threaten national communications policy interests. Id.
11. 92 F.C.C.2d at 870.
12. Id. In the 1983 depreciation order, the FCC construed the legislative history of § 220
of the Communications Act to allow state regulation of accounting and depreciation methods
only so long as the FCC did not designate a conflicting method for determining depreciation.
Id. at 873. The FCC stated that Congress did not intend to allow the states to prescribe
depreciation rates different from those established at the federal level. See id. at 873. But see
infra note 71 (discussing legislative history tending to show state authority over depreciation
methods). Upon FCC designation of conflicting methods, the FCC determined that the Com-
munications Act allows federal preemption of state accounting and depreciation methods. 92
F.C.C.2d 873; see infra note 38 (discussing FCC reasons for preemption of state depreciation
methods).
13. See 92 F.C.C.2d at 876. In the 1983 depreciation order, the FCC stated that state
depreciation rate schedules do not properly provide for capital recovery needed to promote
competition, efficiency, and modernization. Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 151 (stating that FCC must
make available an efficient, nationwide communications system with adequate facilities at
reasonable charges).
14. 92 F.C.C.2d at 875. In the January 6, 1983, order, which mandated FCC preemption
of state depreciation regulations, the FCC stated that state depreciation methods do not provide
for adequate capital recovery, and that such inadequate capital recovery frustrates the FCC
policy of promoting efficient telephone service with adequate facilities. Id.
15. U.S. CoNsT., ART. VI, § 2. Article VI of the United States Constitution states that
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof...shall be the supreme law of the Land...." Id., see United States v. Smith, 393 F.2d
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interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.1 6 Federal law requires
preemption of a state law or regulation when a federal statute expressly
states or clearly implies preemption.' 7 In Virginia State Corporation Com-
mission v. FCC, 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that FCC regulations pertaining to accounting and depreciation practices
preempt any state regulations concerning depreciation methods for intrastate
telephone service prescribed by the Virginia State Corporation Commission
(VSCC).' 9
The conflict in VSCC v. FCC arose from two FCC orders issued during
1980 and 1981.20 In the 1980 order, the FCC determined that the equal life
method 2' of depreciation should replace the vintage year method. 22 The 1980
318, 321 (5th Cir. 1968) (interpreting laws of United States to include federal regulations as
well as federal statutes); cf. Messier v. Zeiller, 373 F. Supp. 1198, 1203 (D.N.H. 1974) (state
statutes, if inconsistent with federal regulations, must conform to federal regulation under
supremacy clause).
16. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The United States Supreme court in Parker
v. Brown stated that Congress could use its power provided by the Constitution to regulate
interstate commerce by instituting federal legislation, the effect of which would be to preempt
conflicting state action. Id. at 350.
17. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (holding
that federal preemption of state regulations may be either express or implied).
18. 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1984).
19. Id. at 396. The Fourth Circuit in Virginia State Corporation Comm'n. (VSCC) v.
FCC stated that state depreciation policies slowed capital recovery and inhibited innovation by
carriers. Id. at 395. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that FCC depreciation methods must
preempt state methods because state methods thwarted the FCC goals of promoting efficiency
and competition. Id. at 392; see 47 U.S.C. § 151 (describing the general policy goals of the
FCC). The dissent in VSCC strongly objected to extending FCC jurisdiction over depreciation
and accounting methods to intrastate telephone service. Id. at 396 (Widener, J., dissenting).
The VSCC dissent noted that the impossibility of severing interstate jurisdiction from intrastate
jurisdiction found in earlier cases did not exist in VSCC. Id. at 397-98 (Widener, J., dissenting);
cf. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n. v. FCC (NCUC 1), 537 F.2d 787, (4th Cir.) (separate FCC
and state regulation of equipment used in both interstate and intrastate service could not coexist
because of impossibility of dual regulation), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976); North Carolina
Utils. Comm'n. v. FCC (NCUC 11), 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.) (separate FCC and state regulation
of equipment used in both interstate and intrastate service could not exist because of impossibility
of dual regulation), cert denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977). Thus, the dissent in VSCC reasoned that
the Fourth Circuit's decisions in NCUC I and NCUC II did not mandate preemption in VSCC.
737 F.2d at 398 (Widener, J., dissenting).
20. See 373 F.2d at 390. In VSCC v. FCC, the Fourth Circuit noted that in a 1980 order
the FCC Determined that the equal life group should replace the vintage group method of
depreciation because of the latter's inaccuracy. Id.; 83 F.C.C.2d 267 (1980). The Fourth Circuit
also examined the FCC's 1981 decision that allowed carriers to charge individual consumers the
cost of inside wiring in homes and businesses. 737 F.2d at 391; 85 F.C.C.2d 818 (1981).
21. See 83 F.C.C.2d at 281 (describing benefits of equal life method including promotion
of new technology and innovation); see also infra text accompanying notes 146-147 (describing
equal life depreciation method).
22. See 83 F.C.C.2d at 293 (stating that vintage year method of depreciation lacks
accuracy to match asset cost recovery with asset service life); see also infra text accompanying
notes 140-145 (describing vintage group method of depreciation).
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order also replaced the whole life method 23 of depreciation with the remaining
life method. 24 The FCC described the objectives of the 1980 order as ensuring
that carriers recover the full cost of an asset in a reasonable manner over
the asset's service life, 25 and promoting innovation and the introduction of
new technology.2 6 The FCC's 1981 order27 specifically required that regulatory
agencies charge the cost of inside wiring for telephone service in homes and
businesses to current users, instead of requiring the carrier to treat the cost
as a capital investment depreciable over time.2 In the 1981 order, the FCC
also sought to promote the goal of overall deregulation of customer-premises-
equipment (CPE) such as inside wiring, the actual telephone unit, and
answering machines. 29 The FCC concluded that deregulation of CPE would
encourage competition between suppliers of CPE by allowing consumers to
choose among different types of CPE provided by various competing sup-
pliers.30
Shortly after the FCC issued its 1981 order, the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) sought clarification of how the
two FCC orders might affect state regulatory commission control over
intrastate telephone service.3 State regulatory commissions control intrastate
23. 83 F.C.C.2d at 289; see infra notes 175-177 (describing whole life method of
depreciation).
24. 83 F.C.C.2d at 288-89; see infra note 179 (describing remaining life method of
depreciation).
25. 83 F.C.C.2d at 294. In the 1980 depreciation order, the FCC stated that to distribute
the full cost of an asset over the asset's service life, the FCC must. utilize the most accurate
means of measuring an asset's useful service life. Id. The FCC concluded that the equal life
method more accurately measures service life than the vintage group method. Id. at 293; see
infra notes 145 and 146 (discussing ELG service life estimations).
26. 83 F.C.C.2d at 281. In the 1980 depreciation order, the FCC noted that technological
change in the communications industry has proceeded at a rapid pace in recent years, and that
the FCC should encourage the continued introduction of new technology. Id.
27. 85 F.C.C.2d 818 (1981).
28. Id. at 828. The FCC noted in the 1981 order that carriers had used a large amount
of investment capital to cover the costs of inside wiring, and stated that consumers should bear
the costs of inside wiring expense. Id.
29. 85 F.C.C.2d at 827. In the 1981 order, the FCC stated that deregulation would
provide a carrier the same regulatory status in marketing customer-premises-equipment (CPE)
as any other supplier of CPE because of the removal of any regulatory barriers to competition.
See id. Consequently, under deregulation, carriers would not receive any undue advantage or
disadvantage in entering the CPE market. See id.
30. Id. The FCC in the 1981 order stated that deregulation of inside wiring would increase
installation choices for consumers and would create new business opportunities for competing
suppliers of terminal equipment. Id.
31. 737 F.2d at 391. The VSCC court noted that the National Association of Railroad
and Utilities Commissioners (NARUC) requested that the FCC issue a statement clarifying the
FCC's 1981 order. Id. NARUC requested that the FCC issue a statement allowing state
commissions to ignore the FCC's 1981 order regarding the prescription of depreciation methods
and the deregulation of inside wiring used in intrastate communications. Id. The FCC then
stated in a 1982 order that when state regulation is reconcilable with federal policies or rules,
the FCC would not preempt state regulations. Id.; 89 F.C.C.2d at 1108.
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service which include the equipment, procedures, and ratemaking process
within the borders of a state. 32 In response to NARUC's request, the FCC
stated in a separate 1982 order that when state accounting and depreciation
regulations were reconcilable with federal rules or goals, the FCC would not
preempt such state regulations. 33 The FCC also stated, however, that the
FCC may preempt state regulatory action whenever state action frustrated
the FCC's policies or rules regarding interstate or foreign communications.
3 4
In response to the 1982 FCC order, the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (AT&T) requested that the FCC reconsider its 1982
order regarding state accounting and depreciation regulation.35 Specifically,
AT&T sought reversal of the FCC's 1982 order that would allow state
commissions to set accounting and depreciation methods other than those
recommended by the FCC.36 Instead, AT&T requested that the FCC require
state commissions to follow FCC prescribed accounting and depreciation
methods across the board.3 7 As a result, just nine months after upholding
state authority to set depreciation methods, the FCC issued its January 6,
1983 order reversing the position taken in the 1982 order, and stating that
depreciation methods prescribed by the FCC always will preempt depreciation
methods set by state regulatory commissions. 38 In VSCC v. FCC, the Virginia
32. See 47 U.S.C. § 221(b) (restricting FCC jurisdiction over intrastate service); see also
supra note 3 (discussing areas of state commission jurisdiction and limits on FCC authority).
33. See 89 F.C.C.2d at 1108 (1982). The FCC stated in a 1982 order that the FCC did
not seek to coerce any state regulatory commission into using ratemaking methods deemed
unacceptable by the state commission. Id. at 1106.
34. 89 F.C.C.2d at 1108. The FCC stated in the 1982 order that the Communications Act
does not prohibit the FCC from preempting state actions that frustrate policies or rules essential
to efficient interstate communications. Id. However, the FCC noted that in regard to state
depreciation methods, the FCC may not preempt state methods merely because carriers would
have to pay the administrative costs of maintaining multiple sets of depreciation records. Id.
The FCC concluded that state depreciation methods and any costs associated with the imple-
mentation of those methods did not frustrate any policies or rules essential to efficient interstate
communication. Id. Nine months after the FCC issued its 1982 order, the FCC reversed its
position and required federal preemption of state depreciation methods. See 92 F.C.C.2d 864
(1983); see also supra note 10 (comparing FCC's 1982 and 1983 orders).
35. 737 F.2d at 391. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC stated that the American Telephone
and Telegraph Company's (AT&T) Petition for Reconsideration resulted in a reversal of FCC
policy regarding the preemption of state depreciation policies. Id.; see 92 F.C.C.2d at 879-880
(requiring that FCC depreciation methods preempt state methods).
36. See 92 F.C.C.2d at 865.
37. See id. at 866-67. The Fourth Circuit noted that the FCC stated in its 1983 order that
it had not adequately considered § 220(b) of the Communications Act in the FCC's 1982 order
allowing state regulation of depreciation method. Id. In reversing the 1982 order, the FCC
noted that § 220(b) of the Communications Act states that the FCC may set accounting and
depreciation methods, but does not specify whether FCC authority extended to prescribing such
methods for intrastate as well as interstate service. Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 220(b) (allowing
FCC prescription of depreciation methods for interstate carriers).
38. See 92 F.C.C.2d at 879. In a 1983 order, the FCC reversed its 1982 ruling allowing
independent state commissions to regulate depreciation methods. Id.; see 89 F.C.C.2d at 1108.
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State Corporation Commission, supported by other state and local regulatory
commissions, filed a petition for review of the FCC's January 6, 1983 Order,
which preempted all state regulation of accounting and depreciation prac-
tices.3 9 The VSCC claimed that the FCC incorrectly determined that the
Communications Act preempted state prescription of depreciation rates and
accounting methods for intrastate ratemaking purposes.40 The VSCC also
asserted that the FCC erred in determining that the differences in depreciation
and accounting methods between interstate and intrastate jurisdictions would
frustrate federal policies and justify preemption under the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution.4'
In analyzing the VSCC's claim, the Fourth Circuit examined two similar
Fourth Circuit cases brought by the North Carolina Utilities Commission
against the FCC.42 In North Carolina Utilities Commission v. FCC (NCUC
1),43 the Fourth Circuit stated that the FCC has primary authority to preempt
state contro4 4 over the interconnection of terminal equipment with the
The FCC justified the reversal on the basis of § 220(b) of the Communications Act, which the
FCC reinterpreted as allowing the FCC to preempt state regulations whenever such regulations
encroach upon interstate service, or frustrate the goals and objectives of the FCC. 92 F.C.C.2d
at 879. The FCC defined the goals served by preemption of state depreciation methods as the
promotion of efficient, competitive interstate service. Id. at 876.
39. 737 F.2d at 392.
40. Id. In VSCC, the VSCC claimed that the FCC lacked authority to preempt state
depreciation methods as a matter of law, since the Communications Act reserved authority over
intrastate practices and methods to the states. Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 221(b) (reserving jurisdiction
over classifications, practices, and facilities used in intrastate service to states).
41. 737 F.2d at 392. In VSCC, the VSCC claimed that the FCC lacked authority to
preempt state depreciation methods because the state could maintain separate depreciation
methods for intrastate and interstate assets. Id.; see infra note 78 (discussing separability of
depreciation methods for intrastate and interstate service). The VSCC stated that state-set
depreciation methods would not frustrate federal policies of promoting greater efficiency and
providing adequate capital recovery. See Brief for Petitioner Virginia State Corporation Com-
mission at 34, VSCC v. FCC, 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1984). The VSCC stated that some states,
including Arizona, California, and Florida, allowed more rapid depreciation than in the methods
prescribed by the FCC. Id. at 35. The VSCC stated that FCC preemption would prevent states
from responding to specific state needs regarding the application of depreciation methods. Id.
The VSCC further claimed that FCC preemption of state depreciation methods would not
necessarily lead to greater efficiency and innovation in communication networks. Id. at 38. The
VSCC noted that historically consumers have contributed to innovation by paying increased
rates which fund research and development. Id. The VSCC stated that no proof exists that state
depreciation methods have frustrated efficiency or innovation in telephone service. Id.
42. See 737 F.2d at 392. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC examined two cases brought by the
North Carolina Utilities Commission against the FCC in which the Fourth Circuit determined
that the FCC regulations may preempt contrary state regulations that threaten interstate
efficiency. Id. at 390; see also infra notes 44 and 52.
43. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n. v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1027 (1976).
44. 537 F.2d at 793. The Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Utils. Comm'n. v. FCC
(NCUC 1) noted that, while the FCC may not preempt state regulatory authority over intrastate
matters that do no substantially affect interstate communications, the Communications Act
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national telephone network. 45 The Fourth Circuit in NCUC I stated that the
FCC must remain free to determine the types of equipment that consumers
may connect with interstate and intrastate communication networks. 46 The
NCUC I court also stated that to allow state regulatory commissions to
restrict the connection of equipment with the communication networks would
frustrate the FCC's authority over interstate service. 47 Placing restrictions
upon equipment used in intrastate service necessarily restricts the use of such
equipment for interstate purposes because the same equipment is connected
to both the intrastate and interstate communications network.4 8 The NCUC
I court recognized, however, that the FCC does not have authority over
services that do not substantially affect the efficiency or safety of interstate
telephone service. 49 In a subsequent suit, North Carolina Utilities Commission
forbids state regulation if the state regulation substantially encroaches upon the statutory
authority of the FCC to preserve the efficiency of the interstate system. Id. The NCUC I court
stated that the FCC's intention of exercising primary authority over the interconnection of
terminal equipment with the national telephone network is a proper and reasonable assertion
of jurisdiction conferred by the Communications Act. Id. at 794.
45. Id. at 791. The Fourth Circuit in NCUC I determined that since terminal equipment
connected to a subscriber's intrastate station and line also connects to the interstate communi-
cations network, such terminal equipment serves both intrastate and interstate service. Id.
Therefore, the NCUC I court held that the FCC may regulate the use and connection of such
equipment. Id.; see also North Carolina Utils. Comm'n. v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1040 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977). The Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Utils. Comm'n.
v. FCC (NCUC II) defined "terminal equipment" as those devices attached to the national
telecommunications network for either transmission or reception of communications. 552 F.2d
at 1040. Such devices include residential telephones, answering machines, and computer termi-
nals. Id.
46. 537 F.2d at 793. The Fourth Circuit in NCUC I stated that state restrictions or
prohibitions on the attachment of equipment by consumers to the intrastate communications
system interfered with the unrestricted connection of such equipment to the interstate system.
Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that such state restrictions infringed on the FCC's authority to
determine the types of equipment consumers may attach to the interstate communications
system. Id.
47. Id. at 794; see supra note 46 (discussing FCC interest in controlling connection of
equipment with interstate communications system).
48. 537 F.2d at 793.
49. Id. The Fourth Circuit in NCUC I stated that separation of the ratemaking process
between intrastate and interstate service does not interfere with FCC authority over interstate
communication. Id. at 793 n.6. The Fourth Circuit stated that while the Communications Act
prohibited the FCC from exercising authority over those local services separable from interstate
communications, the Communications Act allowed the FCC to exercise authority over intrastate
matters that encroached substantially upon interstate service. Id.
In contrast, the NCUC I dissent asserted that Congress intended to establish a telephone
regulatory system with divided jurisdiction between federal and state systems. Id. at 798
(Widener, J., dissenting). The dissent also stated that the literal meaning of § 221(b) of the
Communications Act, read in conjunction with the FCC's interpretation of the statute over the
past 40 years, allows state rather than federal regulation of attachments to intrastate facilities,
even if such intrastate facilities are also connected to interstate service. Id. (Widener, J.,
dissenting); see Communications Act of 1934 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
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v. FCC (NCUC 11),10 the Fourth Circuit stated that FCC regulations preempt
contrary state regulations when the efficiency or safety of the interstate
telephone system is at stake." Without discussing any particular efficiency
or safety considerations, the NCUC II court concluded that the FCC has
full statutory authority to regulate facilities used both in intrastate and
interstate service to ensure the safety of the national communications net-
work.5 2 Although the NCUC II court interpreted the Communications Act
to support FCC preemption of state regulation over equipment used for both
interstate and intrastate service,53 the Fourth Circuit stated that state regu-
latory commissions nonetheless retain authority to set rates for all local
services and facilities. 54 In VSCC, the Fourth Circuit applied the holdings of
NCUC I and NCUC II and determined that all state depreciation methods
(1982)); 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (denying FCC authority over practices or facilities associated with
intrastate service).
50. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n. v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 874 (1977).
51. 552 F.2d at 1046.
52. Id. at 1046-47. The Fourth Circuit in NCUC II acknowledged that FCC preemption
of state regulation over equipment serving both interstate and intrastate service rests on the
FCC's overriding authority to promote an efficient communications network. Id. at 1046. The
Fourth Circuit conceded that the explicit language of § 221(b) of the Communications Act
grants primary authority over facilities used in both interstate and intrastate service to the
states. Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 221(b). The FCC may not exercise jurisdiction over intrastate
charges, classifications, practices, facilities, or regulations in connection with wire, mobile, or
radio communication service, even if a portion of the intrastate service also constitutes interstate
service. Id.
53. 552 F.2d at 1048.
54. See id. at 1048. In NCUC II, the Fourth Circuit stated that Congress had drafted the
Communications Act with the intention of denying the FCC jurisdiction over the establishment
of intrastate telephone rates. Id. at 1047. The Fourth Circuit in NCUC II stated that the FCC's
objection to state restrictions on interconnection of terminal equipment in no way related to
rate setting practices for intrastate service. Id. See Note, Separating the Jurisdictional Authorities
of State and Federal Administrators in the Regulation of the Physical Equipment Within the
Nation's Telephone Network, 8 TOLEDO L. Ray. 733, 738-739 (1977) (examining the jurisdictional
history of the FCC).
In drafting the Communications Act, Congress sought to deny to the FCC the ratemaking
power given to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) by the "Shreveport Doctrine"
announced in the United States Supreme Court decision in Houston, East & West Texas Ry. v.
United States. See Houston, East & West Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
Under the Shreveport doctrine, the Supreme Court held that the ICC had the authority to
preempt state control over intrastate rail shipment rates when local rates created unreasonable
infringement on interstate commerce. Id. at 350-351; see also 78 Cong. Rec. 8823 (1934)
(statement of Senator Dill, Chairman of Senate Interstate Commerce Committee). Senator Dill
stated that Congress enacted the Communications Act to safeguard state regulation of intrastate
telephone service from the Shreveport doctrine. Id. Senator Dill noted that the Shreveport
doctrine had eroded the authority of state commissions to regulate intrastate railroad service.
Id. Senator Dill further stated that the Communications Act protects the right of state
commissions to regulate intrastate service, and does not extend FCC jurisdiction to matters
regulated by state commissions. Id.
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affect the efficiency of interstate telephone service because the depreciation
methods are not separable from interstate communications. 5
In analyzing the VSCC's request for review of the FCC's 1983 order,
the Fourth Circuit in VSCC also reviewed cases from other federal circuits
that involved FCC preemption of state regulatory control.5 6 The Fourth
Circuit found that in all but one case federal courts had allowed FCC
preemption of state regulation.57 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that
all of the cases allowing federal preemption involved impossibility of dual
federal and state regulation because dual federal and state regulation could
not coexist.58 For example, in Computer and Communication Industry
Association v. FCC,59 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit approved FCC preemption of state tariffs on customer-
premises-equipment (CPE)60 such as inside wiring and the telephone unit,
because the court determined such tariffs impeded the federal policy of
deregulating interconnection of CPE. 6' The District of Columbia Circuit,
however, carefully distinguished between the FCC's authority over CPE used
in interstate communications 62 and state authority over intrastate rates.63 The
55. 737 F.2d at 395. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC stated that state depreciation methods
would slow capital recovery and innovation because certain intrastate equipment subject to state
depreciation methods also served interstate service. Id. However, the Fourth Circuit contradicted
its finding that depreciation methods are not separable from interstate service by acknowledging
that carriers could implement separate intrastate and interstate methods. Id. at 396. The Fourth
Circuit stated that carriers could maintain accounts separating intrastate and interstate assets
for depreciation purposes. Id.
56. 737 F.2d at 395-396.
57. See id. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC acknowledged that the United States District
Court for Arkansas held that the FCC lacked jurisdiction to preempt state depreciation methods.
Id. at 392 n.7; see Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 584 F. Supp.
1087 (E.D. Ark. W.D.), rev'd, 738 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1984).
58. See 737 F.2d at 396. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC noted that in many cases state
regulation prohibiting consumers from connecting certain equipment to the interstate commu-
nications networks could not be harmonized with FCC regulation allowing connection of the
equipment. Id. In addition, carriers cannot comply with conflicting state and FCC regulation
concerning interconnection of communications equipment. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated,
however, that carriers could apply conflicting depreciation methods separately to intrastate and
interstate assets. Id.
59. 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, sub nom., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n.
v. FCC, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
60. 693 F.2d at 204 nn.12 & 14. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Computer and Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC (Computer II)
described customer premises equipment (CPE) as including data processing equipment, tele-
phones, answering machines, key systems, and interoffice switchboards. Id.
61. Id. at 216. The District of Columbia Circuit in Computer 1I stated that state tariffs
on CPE provided by carriers would interfere with the consumer's ability to purchase CPE and
would frustrate the federal policy of promoting competition and innovation by limiting the
variety of competing suppliers. Id.
62. Id. In Computer II, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that the practice of using
CPE jointly for interstate and intrastate communications allowed FCC preemption because
when conflicting state policy encroaches on federal policy, federal policy prevails. Id.
63. Id. The D.C. Circuit in Computer II held that the FCC, in determining regulatory
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District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged that state regulatory commissions
and not the FCC had authority to set rates for intrastate service. 64 In a
similar case, New York Telephone Co. v. FCC,65 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that FCC regulation could preempt state
tariffs on interstate telephone calls because such tariffs substantially affected
the conduct or development of interstate communication. 66 Likewise, in
Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. FCC,67 the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit stated that FCC jurisdiction over private branch equip-
ment (PBX)6s should preempt Puerto Rico's authority because PBX affects
access to the interstate telephone system. 69 The First Circuit in Puerto Rico
Telephone conceded that although the literal meaning of certain sections of
the Communication Act would preclude the FCC from regulating intrastate
matters, 70 the legislative history negates the literal meaning of the Commu-
nications Act. 7' The First Circuit stated that a provision in the Communi-
cations Act preventing FCC authority over charges, practices, or facilities
treatment of CPE used for interstate communications, had not attempted to set rates for
intrastate communications. Id.
64. Id. at 215-216. The District of Columbia Circuit in Computer 1I acknowledged that
the Communications Act specifically protects state authority over intrastate rates. Id.; see 47
U.S.C. § 152 (restricting FCC jurisdiction over intrastate service).
65. 631 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1980).
66. Id. at 1066. In New York Telephone Co. v. FCC, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit examined the differences between FCC authority and state commission
authority over interstate and intrastate service, and considered whether the FCC could preempt
state ratemaking authority. Id. The Second Circuit noted that New York Telephone Company
charges on certain interstate consumers ranged up to 1600% higher than the comparable charge
for intrastate consumers, and that such tariffs substantially affected the development of interstate
communication and encroached upon FCC authority. Id. The Second Circuit noted that
separability issues involving the intrastate and interstate ratemaking process did lessen the need
for federal preemption because of the overriding concern that state regulation and tariffs not
affect interstate telephone service. Id.
67. 553 F.2d 694 (Ist Cir. 1977).
68. Id. at 696. In Puerto Rico TeL Co. v. FCC, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit defined private branch equipment (PBX) as including intra-office and intra-
hotel telephone systems and switchboards that provide the link between a private system and
the local telephone service. Id. PBX serves both intrastate and interstate service, and conse-
quently, the First Circuit determined that the FCC may preempt state regulations affecting PBX
that hamper access to the interstate communication system. Id.
69. Id. at 700. In Puerto Rico Telephone, the First Circuit determined that state regulation
of PBX equipment amounted to state control of access to the interstate telephone system. Id.
The First Circuit further stated that the FCC may ensure uniform standards of accessibility to
the interstate system, and thus may preempt conflicting state regulation. Id.
70. Id. at 698. In Puerto Rico Telephone, the First Circuit stated that the language of §§
152(b) and 221(b) of the Communications Act when read literally precludes federal jurisdiction
over intrastate facilities, charges, services, classifications, or regulation. Id.
71. 553 F.2d at 698; see Communications Act of 1934 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 151). The First Circuit in Puerto Rico Telephone interpreted § 221(b) of the Communications
Act as exempting from FCC regulation telephone exchange services in metropolitan areas
overlapping state lines. See 553 F.2d at 698 (quoting S. RP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1934)). The First Circuit stated that the legislative history in favor of federal preemption is
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used in intrastate service applies only to attempted FCC regulation of local
service in a multistate area, such as where a metropolitan area extends across
state lines.72 As a result, the First Circuit determined that, while the Com-
munications Act deprives the FCC of authority over local services and
facilities that are separable from and do not substantially affect interstate
communication, the Communications Act does not prevent the FCC from
preempting state regulation of intrastate matters that encroach upon access
to the interstate telephone system. 73 The First Circuit stated that FCC
jurisdiction extends to interstate service from the inception of such service
to completion. 74 The First Circuit concluded that the Communications Act
deprives the FCC of authority over intrastate services and facilities that are
separable from interstate service, but allows FCC preemption of state regu-
lation that substantially encroaches upon FCC authority over interstate
service.7 5 Consequently, the central issue in cases cited by the Fourth Circuit
in VSCC v. FCC concerns whether state regulation affects or encroaches
upon interstate service and FCC authority.
76
"unequivocal." 553 F.2d at 698. However, the legislative history of the Communications Act
indicates that Congress heeded the requests of state commissions to protect state regulatory
authority over intrastate communication service. See Hearings on H.R. 8301 Before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 136-44 (April 10, 1934).
For example, the general solicitor of the National Association of Railroad and Utility Commis-
sions (NARUC), Mr. J. Benton, stated that § 220 of the Communications Act takes account of
local conditions and consequently acknowledges the powers of state commissions regarding
regulation of depreciation and accounting. Id. Benton also stated that § 220 provides that the
control of intrastate telephone service exercised by the states will continue to be exercised by
the states without interference by the FCC. Id.; see 78 CONG. Rc. S8822 (May 15, 1934). In
the Senate hearing on the Communications Act, Senator Dill, sponsor of the Act, stated that
Congress attempted to safeguard state regulation so that when state commissions regulate
existing intrastate telephone service, the provisions of the Communications Act allowing federal
preemption will not apply. Id. Senator Dill stated that Congress wanted to protect the right of
state commissions to regulate intrastate service by preventing the FCC from usurping state
authority. See 78 CoNG. REc. H3285 (June 2, 1934). Congressman Sam Rayburn stated that §
221(b) of the Communications Act leaves regulation of local telephone service to state or local
commissions even when a portion of such local service extends across state boundaries. Id.
72. 553 F.2d at 698-699. The First Circuit in Puerto Rico Telephone stated that the
restrictions on FCC authority provided by the Communications Act sweep less broadly than the
statutory language would indicate. Id. at 698; see supra note 71 (discussing legislative history
of §§ 220 and 221 of Communications Act).
73. 553 F.2d at 700. In Puerto Rico Telephone, the First Circuit stated that even though
PBX is used mainly for intrastate service, PBX also is used for interstate service. Id. The First
Circuit stated that just because PBX serves mainly intrastate service does not outweigh the need
to assure uniform and reasonable access to the interstate communications network. Id. Carriers
could not apply both federal regulations allowing unrestrained connection of PBX to the
interstate system and commonwealth regulation restricting the connection of PBX to the
intrastate system simultaneously, and consequently the First Circuit held that FCC regulations
must preempt conflicting state regulations. Id.
74. Id. at 699.
75. 553 F.2d at 699-700.
76. 737 F.2d at 392-393; see supra notes 62, 66, & 69 (discussing recent federal circuit
courts of appeals decisions regarding FCC preemption of state regulation).
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The Fourth Circuit's decision in VSCC also recognized that the impos-
sibility of compliance with dual regulation in the cases decided by other
federal circuit courts of appeals 77 prevented carriers from applying both
federal and state regulations. 78 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged, however,
that the VSCC case raised no question of impossibility of complying with
dual regulation. 9 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit noted that state depreciation
and accounting methods applied separately to intrastate service would not
hinder the FCC's ability to set depreciation and accounting methods for
facilities within the FCC's interstate jurisdiction. 0 The Fourth Circuit also
stated that carriers may maintain separate accounts for the depreciation of
intrastate and interstate assets to comply with dual regulation.8 Conse-
quently, the Fourth Circuit did not determine whether the language of the
Communications Act required preemption, but held only that the FCC's
affirmative regulatory action in the interest of protecting efficient interstate
service allowed preemption of state depreciation methods.
2
In examining the statutory intent of the Communications Act, the Fourth
Circuit in VSCC conceded that the plain statutory language of the Commu-
nications Act reserves to the states the authority to prescribe rates for
intrastate telephone service."3 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit failed to cite
77. 737 F.2d at 392-393.
78. See id. at 396. In VSCC, the Fourth Circuit stated that unlike cases in which conflicting
FCC and state regulations could not exist simultaneously, carriers could keep separate accounts
for depreciation of intrastate and interstate assets and could comply with both FCC and state
depreciation methods. Id. The Fourth Circuit held, however, that even if carriers could comply
with both federal and state depreciation regulations, the FCC may preempt state regulations to
promote the development of interstate facilities, Id.; cf. NCUC I, 537 F.2d at 793 n.6 (4th Cir.
1976). The Fourth Circuit in NCUC I stated that the ratemaking process may be divided
between interstate and intrastate systems in such a manner that state regulation would not
interfere with federal regulation. Id. at 793 n.6.
79. See 737 F.2d at 396.
80. Id.; see Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 148 (1930). In Smith v. Illinois
Bell Tel. Co. the United States Supreme Court stressed the importance and necessity of separating
intrastate and interstate property in order to properly distinguish between state and federal
control. Id. The Supreme Court stated that under § 20(5) of the Interstate Commerce Act, the
ICC could prescribe the classes of property for which depreciation charges may properly be
included in operating expenses, and the percentages of depreciation to be charged with respect
to each class of property. Id. at 149. When portions of the Interstate Commerce Act became
part of the Communications Act of 1934, the new statutory language acknowledged separation
of FCC and state authority over interstate and intrastate rates. See id.; see supra notes 54 and
68 (discussing legislative history of Communications Act).
81. 737 F.2d at 396; see supra note 73 (discussing dual state and federal regulation of
depreciation methods).
82. See 737 F.2d at 392. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC held that any FCC action taken to
promote efficiency and innovation was sufficient to preempt inconsistent state action. Id. The
Fourth Circuit consequently declined to determine whether as a matter of law the statutory
language of the Communications Act required preemption. Id.
83. See id.
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legislative history that would support a contrary reading of the Communi-
cations Act. 4 Instead, the Fourth Circuit held that the state's frustration of
federal objectives through depreciation methods that allegedly affect inter-
state communications justified preemption in VSCC v. FCC.5 According to
the Fourth Circuit, the federal objectives that justify FCC preemption are
the rapid development of interstate facilities and the maintenance of an
efficient, viable interstate telecommunications network.s6 The Fourth Circuit
failed to determine, however, how state prescription of accounting and
depreciation rules for intrastate telephone service frustrate federal objec-
tives.17 In explaining its holding, the Fourth Circuit in VSCC stated that
although state regulation of accounting and depreciation rules did not hinder
federal objectives during the years of carrier monopoly power,8" state regu-
84. See id. at 390; see Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 157.
Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta did not involve an FCC regulation but rather
concerned preemption by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board of state limitations on certain
practices by federal savings and loan associations. Id. at 167. However, the Fourth Circuit in
VSCC relied on de la Cuesta to apply the United States Supreme Court's test for federal
preemption of state regulation. 737 F.2d at 393. The de la Cuesta Court ruled that in determining
whether federal preemption of state law is proper, the focus on the intent of Congress is not
the sole means of inquiry. 458 U.S. at 157. The Court stated that the federal regulation must
not be unreasonable, unauthorized, or inconsistent with the underlying statute. Id.; see Ridgway
v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 57 (1981). The de la Cuesta Court further stated that federal
regulations should not be disturbed unless the statute or legislative history indicates that Congress
would not have sanctioned such a regulation. 458 U.S. at 154 (quoting United States v. Shimer,
367 U.S. 374, 381-382 (1961)). See generally Memorandum Opinion and Order, 89 F.C.C.2d at
1106 (1982). The FCC stated in its 1982 order that the legislative history of the Communications
Act is at best uncertain as to whether state accounting and depreciation rules can be preempted
by the FCC, although an inference may be drawn that Congress did not intend to preempt
inconsistent state commission accounting practices. Id. The FCC reversed this finding nine
months later in a 1983 order. See 92 F.C.C.2d at 869; see also supra note 71 (discussing
legislative history of Communications Act of 1934).
85. 737 F.2d at 396. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC stated that the federal objective of
developing and modernizing the communications systems would suffer if Virginia continued to
use the state depreciation methods, which slowed capital recovery. Id. at 395.
86. Id. at 390.
87. Id. at 394. In VSCC, the Fourth Circuit stated that improper recovery of capital
invested by carriers in particular communications equipment posed a threat to innovation in a
competitive market. Id. The VSCC court, however, failed to explain the relationship of
depreciation rules to capital recovery and innovation. Id. See generally W. BOLTER & D. IRWIN,
DEPRECIATION REFORM, A CRUCIAL STEP IN TRANSFORMINO TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO A FREE
MARKET 9-12 (1980) (describing relationship between depreciation policies and modernization).
88. 737 F.2d at 394. In VSCC, the Fourth Circuit noted that state commissions had
tended to follow FCC directives during the years before the breakup of the nationwide Bell
System. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated, however, that the current competitive marketplace
requires proper capital recovery. Id. However, competitive markets do not necessarily exist in
the area of providing local telephone services. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
552 F. Supp. 131, (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom., Illinois v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983). In United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), the District Court for the District
of Columbia recognized the monopoly characteristics of local telephone service provided by
intrastate carriers, and stated that a state may continue to require that a regulated monopoly
provide local telephone service. Id. at 159 n.117, 224.
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lation now poses a threat to competition. 9 The Fourth Circuit further stated
that flexibility in depreciation practice may result in improper capital recovery
for carriers, and that such improper recovery could hinder competition."
The Fourth Circuit did not explain what competitive markets are threatened
by state regulation of intrastate telephone service. 9'
In analyzing the ability of the FCC to preempt state regulatory commis-
sions, the Fourth Circuit also examined preemption as defined by the United
States Supreme Court in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Co. v. de la
Cuesta.92 The de la Cuesta Court stated that when federal law and state law
conflict, federal law nullifies state law. 93 The Supreme court further stated
that such a conflict occurs when state law obstructs Congressional directives
or objectives.9 4 The de la Cuesta Court described the guidelines for deter-
mining federal preemption in the form of a two-prong test.9 First, courts
must consider whether the regulatory agency meant for the federal regulation
to preempt state law.96 Second, courts must decide whether the action taken
by the agency fell within the agency's delegated authority. 7 The de la Cuesta
Court further stated that federal agency regulations meant to preempt state
law should not be disturbed unless the language of the federal statue or the
legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend such preemption. 98
89. 737 F.2d at 394. In VSCC, the Fourth Circuit noted that 75% of all carrier investment
in new equipment falls within the intrastate service category. Id. at 395. The FCC stated that
if a large percentage of equipment investment should fail to receive adequate depreciation
allowance, interstate service would suffer due to delayed innovation because certain intrastate
equipment such as switchboards and connecting units also serves interstate service. Id.
90. Id. at 394.
91. See id. In VSCC, the Fourth Circuit discussed the threat of state depreciation methods
to competitive markets. Id. The Fourth Circuit did not, however, identify any particular
competitive markets, or indicate how competition should be considered in weighing factors
related to federal preemption. See id.
92. 737 F.2d at 393; Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982). The United States Supreme Court held in de la Cuesta that federal regulation may
preempt state regulation even without express directives from Congress when the overall effect
of federal regulation infers preemption. Id.
93. 458 U.S. at 153.
94. Id. The United States Supreme Court in de la Cuesta defined the boundaries of state
law compliance with congressional objectives by stating that such state regulations must not be
unreasonable, unauthorized, or inconsistent with the underlying statute. Id. at 154 (quoting
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).
95. Id.
96. Id. The United States Supreme Court in de la Cuesta stated that when an administrator
of an agency promulgates regulations intended to preempt state law, the federal regulation
should not be disturbed by a court unless the underlying statute or its legislative history indicates
that Congress would not have sanctioned the federal regulation. Id.
97. Id. The United States Supreme Court in de la Cuesta stated that a court must
determine the scope of an agency's delegated authority by examining the underlying statute or
legislative history to see if Congress would have sanctioned preemption. Id.
98. Id. (quoting United States v. Shimer, 267 U.S. 374, 381-382 (1961)).
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The Court further indicated that an analysis of legislative history may be
crucial in determining the scope of an agency's preemption authority. 99
Based on its reasoning in VSCC v. FCC, the Fourth Circuit did not
satisfy the test for federal preemption as defined by the Supreme Court in
de la Cuesta.'00 The Fourth Circuit correctly determined that the FCC
satisfied the first prong of the de la Cuesta test by intending to preempt
inconsistent state regulation.101 However, concerning the second prong of the
de la Cuesta test, the Fourth Circuit in VSCC specifically acknowledged that
the Communications Act reserves to the states the authority to prescribe
rates for intrastate telephone service, and prevents the FCC from assuming
jurisdiction with respect to intrastate telephone service.' 2 The Fourth Circuit
also did not contend that the overall intent of the Communications Act
implied preemption or that the Communications Act leaves no room for
99. Id.; cf. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (courts may
infer legislative intent through statutory language); Bread Political Action Comm. v. Fed.
Elections Comm'n., 455 U.S. 577, 584 (1982) (best evidence of what Congress intended is found
in language of statute itself, absent clearly contrary legislative intent).
100. See 737 F.2d at 394. In VSCC, the Fourth Circuit held that the FCC could preempt
any state regulation that impaired efficient interstate telephone service. Id. The Fourth Circuit
based its holding on § 151 of the Communications Act, which stated that the FCC should make
available an efficient, nationwide communications system with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges. Id. at 390; see 47 U.S.C. § 151. The Fourth Circuit stated that state depreciation
methods threaten the efficient operation of the communications industry in a competitive
market, but failed to show how state depreciation methods result in inefficient or inadequate
facilities, or in unreasonable charges. See 737 F.2d at 393-95. Further, the Fourth Circuit chose
not to follow a provision of the Communications Act which states that the FCC must not
construe the Act to give the FCC jurisdiction with respect to intrastate service. See id. at 392;
47 U.S.C. § 152(b). In addition, the Fourth Circuit did not choose to follow the more specific
statutory language of a provision of the Communications Act which forbids FCC jurisdiction
over any intrastate service regulated by a state commission even if a portion of the intrastate
service constitutes interstate or foreign communication. 737 F.2d at 392; 47 U.S.C. § 221(b).
The Fourth Circuit instead stated that the FCC intended to preempt state regulation, thereby
satisfying the first prong of the de la Cuesta test. 737 F.2d at 393. The Fourth Circuit stated
that the FCC also satisfied the second prong of the de la Cuesta test because the preemption
of intrastate depreciation methods fell within the delegated authority of the FCC by virtue of
the FCC's interest in promoting efficiency. 737 F.2d at 393-94. The dissent in VSCC stated that
the Fourth Circuit's holding had effectively written out of the Communications Act §§ 152(b)
and 221(b) which prohibit FCC jurisdiction over intrastate practices, methods, and facilities.
Id. at 398 (Widener, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the FCC consequently could usurp
all state regulatory authority over intrastate matters by asserting that federal preemption will in
some way foster competition in a market that the FCC need not specify. Id.
101. 737 F.2d at 393. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC stated that the FCC clearly meant to
preempt inconsistent state regulation. Id. The Fourth Circuit quoted the FCC's 1983 depreciation
order, which demonstrated that the FCC specifically stated an intention to preempt inconsistent
state depreciation methods. Id. at 393-94; see 92 F.C.C.2d at 879-80 (preempting state depre-
ciation methods).
102. 737 F.2d at 392. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC stated that the Communications Act
reserves to the states the power to set rates for intrastate service as long as such authority does
not hinder efficient interstate service. Id.
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supplementary action by the states. 03 On the contrary, the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged the role of state regulatory authority as outlined in the
statutory language of the Communications Act.104 Furthermore, while the
Fourth Circuit emphasized the goal of promoting efficiency, the Fourth
Circuit failed to show that the use of state depreciation methods during the
last forty years resulted in inefficiency or in any tangible way hampered the
interstate telephone system. 05 Thus, while the Fourth Circuit determined that
the FCC intended that federal regulation of depreciation and accounting
methods would preempt state law, the Fourth Circuit failed to show that the
action taken by the FCC fell within the agency's delegated authority.'
t 6
The Fourth Circuit's decision in VSCC v. FCC expands the doctrine of
federal preemption.0 7 The Fourth Circuit specifically extended the parameters
of federal preemption to include not only cases in which state and federal
regulations inescapably conflict, but also cases in which federal and state
103. Id. at 396. The Fourth Circuit did not reach the question of whether the language of
the Communications Act requires preemption. See id. at 392. Instead, the Fourth Circuit stated
that the affirmative regulatory action taken by the FCC to promote efficiency allowed preemp-
tion. Id. The Fourth Circuit failed to show, however, that the structure and and purpose of the
Communications Act eliminates state regulation, and in fact the Fourth Circuit acknowledged
that the Act grants state authority in some instances. See id. at 390. The Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that the Communications Act provides for state regulation of charges, classifi-
cations, practices, services, and facilities for intrastate telephone service. Id. at 390; see 458
U.S. 141, 153; see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(b), 221(b) The language of the Communications Act
specifically carves out areas for state regulation, including ratemaking. Id. The Supreme Court
in de la Cuesta stated that preemption of state law may occur when state law conflicts with
federal law. 458 U.S. at 153. In Jones v. Rath Packing Co., the Supreme Court allowed federal
preemption when explicitly provided for by Congress in statutory language, or when explicitly
provided for by Congress in the structure and purpose of a statute. Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, the Supreme
Court defined a conflict between state and federal regulation as requiring federal preemption
when compliance with both federal and state regulations is an impossibility. Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963). The Fourth Circuit acknowledged
that the VSCC case raised no question of impossibility that Virginia carriers could comply with
both federal and state regulation. 737 F.2d at 396.
104. See 737 F.2d at 392 (discussing state authority to prescribe rates for intrastate service).
105. See id. at 395-396. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC stated that state depreciation methods
would provide capital recovery for carriers at a slower rate than the methods proposed by the
FCC. Id. at 395. However, the Fourth Circuit did not find that the rate of capital recovery
under various state depreciation methods was insufficient to provide for an efficient commu-
nications system at reasonable cost. See id. at 395-96.
106. 737 F.2d at 396. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC stated that preemption of inconsistent
state regulation is justified when state regulation hinders the development of interstate facilities.
Id. The Fourth Circuit did not indicate, however, whether 40 years of state depreciation methods
had hindered the development of adequate and efficient interstate facilities. See id. If state
depreciation methods provide adequate and efficient facilities and service, then the FCC acted
beyond its scope of delegated authority in preempting such state depreciation methods. See
Brief for Petitioner VSCC at 41, VSCC v. FCC, 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1984); see also supra
note 100 (discussing FCC's goal of promoting efficiency as basis for preemption).
107. See 737 F.2d at 396. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC specifically stated that the existence
of a physical impossibility of compliance with dual federal and state regulation is not the only
basis for federal preemption of state regulation. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that frustration of
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regulations may coexist. 08 In VSCC, the Fourth Circuit recognized the ability
of carriers to comply with both interstate and intrastate regulations for
accounting and depreciation. 0 9 The Fourth Circuit, nonetheless, upheld the
federal preemption of state regulation even when regulation of intrastate
service could be harmonized with differing federal regulation of interstate
service.1"0
FCC jurisdiction over interstate service was effectively limited, however,
by the decision of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia in United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&7)."
In AT&T, the district court recognized the separability of local or intrastate
telephone service from interstate service." 2 The AT&T court further recog-
nized the authority of the states to regulate intrastate telephone service,"'
federal objectives also provides a valid basis for preemption. Id. For example, in Hines v.
Davidowitz, the United States Supreme court allowed federal preemption of state law when
state regulation obstructed the accomplishment and execution of purposes and objectives of
Congress. 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). In contrast
to the Hines decision, the United States Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California later upheld
state law differing with federal law when differences in the law's objectives were reconcilable.
412 U.S. at 554-555. Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor upheld state regulation of unemployment
compensation for employees involved in a strike even though the state regulation conflicted
with the broad federal policy of free collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations
Act. See 566 F.2d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd 440 U.S. 519 (1979). The Second Circuit stated
that Congress had shown a willingness to tolerate such a conflict to give deference to state
authority. Id. In VSCC, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that conflicting state depreciation
methods could coexist with FCC methods. 737 F.2d at 396. In creating the Communications
Act, Congress indicated a willingness to protect and preserve state regulation over intrastate
telephone service from FCC preemption. See supra note 71 (discussing the legislative history of
the Communications Act).
108. 737 F.2d at 396.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC stated that a state law's frustration of federal
objectives often provides a valid basis for federal preemption even if the carriers could comply
with differing state and federal depreciation methods. Id. The Fourth Circuit did not explain
why the federal objective of promoting efficiency should preempt intrastate depreciation methods
set by state commissions. See id.; see also supra notes 105-06 (discussing Fourth Circuit's failure
to show that state depreciation methods frustrate efficiency).
111. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983). In United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia entered an antitrust decree ordering the divestiture
by AT&T of twenty-two local operating companies, or any companies that provided essentially
intrastate service. Id. at 141.
112. 552 F. Supp. at 141. The AT&T court held that the Bell System could no longer
supply local telephone service. Id. The AT&T court determined that local service would be
supplied by independent operating companies that would serve a certain exchange area. Id. The
exchange area would be limited to the territory of one state unless specifically approved by the
court. Id. The district court further provided that the operating companies would provide local
telephone service within the same exchange area and would provide access to calls from other
exchange areas. Id. The AT&T court specifically prohibited the local operating companies from
providing interexchange service, or service from one exchange area to another. Id. at 142.
113. Id. at 169. The AT&T court acknowledged the dual authority of state and federal
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and acknowledged the division of state and federal authority between intras-
tate and interstate service." 4 The AT&T court required the American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Company to sever relations with subsidiary telephone
companies that supply local telephone service."3 The AT&T court then
directed the subsidiary companies to supply local telephone service within a
given "exchange area," which usually constitutes a local or intrastate area."1
6
The district court in AT&T determined that the interexchange17 or interstate
portion of calls would be carried by AT&T and other interstate carriers."'
The FCC has ruled that local carriers engaged in interstate communication
solely through physical connection with the facilities of an interstate carrier
such as AT&T are exempt from FCC jurisdiction. 19 Inasmuch as the AT&T
court had expressly forbidden local carriers that provided intrastate service
from providing interstate service, the sole link between the local carriers
regulated by state commissions and interstate carriers regulated by the FCC
lies in a physical connection. 20 The AT&T court recognized that state
regulatory agencies to set rates and tariffs. Id. For example, the AT&T court defined the
division of state and federal regulatory control by requiring state regulators to set rates for
intraexchange service, and requiring the FCC to set rates for interexchange or interstate service.
Id. at 169 n.161.
114. Id. at 169. The AT&T court separated state and federal authority into two distinct
categories by noting that state regulators set access charges for intrastate long distance service
while the FCC sets access charges for interstate long distance service. Id. The AT&T court
stated that local telephone companies possess a monopoly over local telephone service, and may
not engage in providing long distance interstate service. Id. at 224. Consequently, the AT&T
court acknowledged that state regulatory commissions have authority over local telephone
companies, since such companies may not provide interstate service which is subject to FCC
regulation. See id.
115. Id. at 141.
116. Id. The AT&T court defined an exchange area as a standard metropolitan area or the
territory of one state. Id. The AT&T court further stated that before a state may regulate
service in a territory extending beyond its boundaries, the state must obtain approval from the
United States Department of Justice. Id. at 141 n.36.
117. Id. at 141 n.39. The AT&T court defined interexchange service as long distance
service. Id.
118. Id. at 141.
119. See The Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(2). Section 152(b)(2) states that the
FCC shall not have jurisdiction over any intrastate carrier involved in interstate or foreign
communication solely through physical connection with the facilities of another carrier. Id., see
Classification of Telephone Companies, 3 F.C.C. 37 (1935). In Classification of Telephone
Companies, the FCC ruled that carriers engaged in interstate or foreign communication solely
through physical connection with the facilities of another carrier are exempt from FCC
jurisdiction, except under limited exceptions. Id., 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-205. For example, § 201 of
the Communications Act grants the FCC the 'authority to regulate telephone company charges
for interstate service. 47 U.S.C. § 201. Section 202 allows the FCC to punish telephone
companies for discriminatory practices. Id. § 202. Section 203 requires the filing of certain
tariffs. Id. § 203. Section 204 provides for a hearing to evaluate proposed rate changes. Id. §
204. Section 205 grants the FCC authority to vary rates in accordance with § 201. Id. § 205.
The FCC further stated that even FCC jurisdiction under §§ 201-205 of the Communications
Act may be subject to valid state regulation. 3 F.C.C. 37 (1935).
120. See 552 F. Supp. at 169. The AT&T court noted that operating companies that are
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commissions and not the FCC would regulate local carriers, even though
local carriers are linked to the interstate telephone system.'2, Consequently,
the AT&T court, by preventing local carriers from providing interstate
service, effectively denied the FCC the authority to regulate local carriers
because the Communications Act limits FCC jurisdiction to interstate mat-
ters.12
2
Consistent with the Fourth Circuit's VSCC decision upholding FCC
preemption of depreciation and accounting methods, 23 decisions prior to
VSCC usually enforced the FCC's 1983 depreciation order. 24 For example,
six federal district courts had enjoined state regulatory commission from
disobeying the FCC's 1983 order concerning depreciation methods. 25 In
contrast, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
restricted to providing local telephone service will have facilities to connect with other carriers
providing interstate service. Id.
121. See 552 F. Supp. at 169, see also supra note 119 (discussing limits on FCC regulation
of intrastate service).
122. See 552 F. Supp. at 141; see also supra notes 112 (defining the restricted service area
of intrastate carriers) and 119 (discussing limits on FCC regulation of intrastate service).
123. See infra note 78 (discussing FCC preemption of state depreciation methods).
124. See infra note 125 (describing federal district court cases upholding FCC's 1983
preemption order).
125. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dep't of Public Serv. Regulation, 588 F.
Supp. 5 (D. Mont. 1983). The district court in Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dep't of
Pub. Serv. Reg. granted the Mountain States Company a preliminary injunction requiring the
state public utilities commission to follow FCC depreciation methods. Id. at 9. The Mountain
States court stated that it did not have jurisdiction to reverse an FCC order, and that public
utilities commissions must follow the FCC's 1983 order until reversed by a federal court of
appeals. Id. at 7; see Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 584 F. Supp.
1087 (D.E. Ark. 1984) (upholding FCC's 1983 depreciation order); infra note 128 and accom-
panying text (discussing district court's upholding of FCC preemption in Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm.), see also South Central Bell Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm., 570 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1983). The district court in South Central Bell Tel.
Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm. granted South Central Bell a preliminary injunction
preventing the public service commission from using depreciation methods other than those
required by the FCC. Id. at 238. The South Central court stated that orders of administrative
agencies carry the full force of federal law and possess the same preemptive effect. Id. at 232;
see Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 560 F. Supp. 844 (D. Md. 1983).
The district court in Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n ordered the public
service commission to adhere to the FCC's 1983 preemption order. Id. at 849. The Chesapeake
court also stipulated that the, Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. return any excess monies collected
from consumers if the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
validity of the FCC order in VSCC v. FCC. Id. at 849; see New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Pub. Util. Comm'n of -Maine, 570 F. Supp., 1558 (D. Me. 1983). The district court in New
England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. of Maine stated that the Communications Act
provides that the federal district court shall enforce duly made FCC orders. Id. at 1574; see 47
U.S.C. § 401(b). The New England Tel. court granted a preliminary injunction requiring that
the public utilities commission obey the FCC's 1983 preemption order. 570 F. Supp. at 1582;
see Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm., 565 F. Supp. 17 (W.D.
Wash. 1983). The district court in Pacific N. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Washington Util. & Transp.
Comm'n noted that it did not have jurisdiction over the question of whether the FCC had the
[Vol. 42:301
VSCC v. FCC
refused to enforce an FCC preemption order. 2 6 In Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Company v. Arkansas Public Service Commission,127 the Arkansas
district court determined that the preemption order sought by the FCC would
require express congressional approval and characterized the FCC order as
ultra vires, or beyond the scope of FCC authority.'28 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, reversed the district
court's decision. 29 The Eighth Circuit directed the district court to enjoin
the Arkansas Commission from disobeying the FCC order because federal
law grants federal courts of appeal exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside,
or determine the validity of FCC orders. 30 Generally, federal district courts
have upheld the FCC's 1983 order that mandated federal preemption of state
regulations. Moreover, federal circuit courts of appeal also have upheld the
1983 FCC order and have reversed contrary district court decisions. 3'
The Fourth Circuit's decision in VSCC requiring state regulatory com-
missions to follow FCC prescribed depreciation methods will have a signifi-
cant impact on the rate setting practices of state commission.3 2 Depreciation
statutory authority to preempt state depreciation charges. Id. at 21. However, the Pacific N. W.
court granted Pacific N.W. Bell a preliminary injunction requiring the utility -commission to
obey the FCC's 1983 order preempting state depreciation methods. Id. at 21-22.
126. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 584 F. Supp. 1087, 1092
(E.D. Ark.) rev'd, 738 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1984).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1090. The district court in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Arkansas Public
Service Comm. characterized the FCC's 1983 depreciation order as ultra vires because the FCC
lacked the statutory power to preempt inconsistent state depreciation and accounting methods.
Id. at 1089. The district court noted that if the FCC wanted the authority to preempt, the FCC
should seek express Congiessional approval. Id. at 1090.
129. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission, 738 F.2d
901, 905 (8th Cir. 1984).
130. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n noted that federal law grants federal courts of appeal
exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside or determine the validity of FCC orders. Id.; see 28
U.S.C. § 2342(l) (1982). The Eighth Circuit held that the exclusive grant of jurisdiction to
federal courts of appeal for review of FCC orders precludes district courts from exercising such
authority. Id. at 906. The Eighth Circuit did not examine whether the FCC acted beyond its
authority in preempting state depreciation methods, but rather held that district courts should
enforce the FCC preemption order unless a federal court of appeals overrules the FCC's order.
Id.
131. See supra notes 125 & 130 (discussing court rulings upholding the FCC's 1983
preemption order).
132. See 737 F.2d at 394; see A. KAHN, Tr Ecotlocs OF REGULATION 32-35 (1970). The
depreciation methods required by the FCC allow a carrier to increase depreciation expenses,
and the increased depreciation expenses are included in a carrier's operating costs. See id. at
35. The cost of carrier service determines consumer rates. See id.; see C. PHILLIPS, JR., THE
EcoNo~ncs OF REGULATION 194-206 (1969). Depreciation deductions reimburse carriers for the
cost of an asset and for the capital required to make the original purchase, and carriers also
may include such costs in the rates charged to consumers. See id. at 194-195; see also Lindheimer
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 167 (1934). The United States Supreme Court in
Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. stated that in determining consumer rates, carriers may
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charges are included in carrier operating costs 13 3 and operating costs serve as
a guide for setting consumer rates.3 4 The method of determining the depre-
ciable life3' of an asset affects consumer rates because a shorter depreciation
life allows a higher depreciation charge, which increases annual capital
costs. 36 If a carrier incurs higher annual capital costs, the carrier will require
a higher consumer rate increase to cover operating costs.1
37
Prior to the FCC's 1983 preemption order, 38 carriers could determine
depreciation life through the vintage group and whole life methods of
depreciation. 3 9 The vintage group method (VG) of determining depreciation
calculates the average service life of a particular group of equipment to
provide the basis for depreciation of a class or subclass of depreciable
equipment."40 The average life of all items in the group constitutes the
depreciable life for the group even if the group contains equipment with
include in operating costs an allowance for consumption of capital. 292 U.S. at 167; see
American Telephone and Telegraph Company Divestiture Effects, September 25, 1984: Hearings
Before the House Committee on Small Business, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (statement of
Bruce Hagen, Vice Chairman of Committee on Communications, National Association of
Railroad and Utility Commissioners). Hagen stated that the Fourth Circuit's VSCC decision
will put pressure on local companies to raise telephone rates. Id. Hagen said that higher
telephone rates for consumers will occur because of additional regulatory costs arising from the
change in accounting methods and the implementation of accelerated depreciation. Id. at 9. See
also infra note 183 (discussing rate increases for consumers due to implementation of FCC-
prescribed depreciation method).
133. See J. SUELFLOW, PUBLIC UTrITY ACCOUNTING: THEORY AND APPLICATION 57-58
(1973). Operating expenses represent the carrier's cost of doing business including property
acquisition, maintenance, wages, taxes, and depreciation. Id.
134. See Pmupps, supra note 132 at 129-130. Operating costs constitute the largest portion
of a carrier's revenue requirement. Id. at 129. State commissions set rates to allow a carrier to
cover operating costs, and to earn a reasonable rate of return on business property. Id. As a
carrier's operating expense increases, the expected amount of consumer contribution or rates
also increases. Id.
135. See W. BOLTER & D. IRwN, DEPRECIATION REFORM, A CRUCIAL STEP IN TRANsFoRMIa
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO A FREE MARKET 13-17 (1980). The depreciable life of an asset
corresponds to the period during which a carrier recovers the original value or cost of the asset.
Id.
136. See E. BRIrHAM & J. PAPPAS, LIBERALIZED DEPRECIATION AND THE COST OF CAPITAL
30 (1970). The length of an asset's life determines the yearly amount of depreciation expense
because the amount of depreciation is divided by the number of years of an asset's life. Id. A
longer asset life results in a lower annual depreciation charge, whereas a shorter asset life
requires a higher depreciation charge. Id. For example, a transformer costing $100 with a service
life of 20 years results in a depreciation charge to consumers of $5 per year for 20 years. If the
same transformer has an estimated service life of 5 years, the depreciation expense for consumers
is $20 per year for 5 years.
137. See supra note 136 (describing the relationship between service life an depreciation
expense).
138. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 92 F.C.C.2d 864 (1983).
139. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 89 F.C.C.2d 1094, 1106-1107 (1982) (state
regulatory commissions may employ accounting and depreciation rules of their own choosing).
140. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 83 F.C.C.2d 267, 268 (1980). The FCC stated
that the vintage group method of calculating depreciation is a form of straight line depreciation.
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varying life expectancies. 141 VG depreciation is calculated on a straight line
basis. 42 The FCC determined that VG does not match capital recovery with
the rate of capital consumption when a carrier retires equipment before an
age equal to the vintage group average. 43 The FCC decided, therefore, that
state regulatory commissions should not use the VG method of calculating
depreciation. 44
Instead, the FCC now requires the use of the equal life group (ELG)
depreciation method.1 4s ELG actually breaks down a group of carrier assets
under VG into smaller subgroups to allow greater accuracy in measur-
ing depreciable life. 46 ELG is a form of accelerated deprecia-
Id.; see infra note 142 (describing straight line depreciation). The vintage group method of
depreciation categorizes all similar types of equipment purchased in a particular year into
vintage groups. See Brief for Respondent FCC at 11, VSCC v. FCC, 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.
1984). Carriers depreciate all equipment in a vintage group according to the average useful life
of the entire group of equipment, even though some items within the group have shorter or
longer lives than the group average. Id. at 11-12.
141. See supra note 140 (describing vintage group depreciation method).
142. 83 F.C.C.2d at 275; 47 C.F.R. § 31-013(gg). The FCC defines straight line depreciation
as when the value of an asset is charged to operating expenses and then credited to a depreciation
reserve account through equal annual charges that correspond as closely as possible to the
asset's service life. Id. For example, if a particular transformer costs $100 with an estimated
useful life of 10 years, the straight line method of depreciation would allow the carrier to assign
$10 per year as a depreciation expense. Carriers may recover depreciation expense annually
through increases in telephone rates charged to the consumer.
143. 83 F.C.C.2d at 290. The FCC stated that the vintage group method does not allow
for proper investment recovery in a competitive environment where estimated asset service lives
may shorten dramatically due to obsolescence. Id.; see KAuN, supra note 132, at 146-148 (stating
that traditional depreciation rates have been rendered obsolete by technological progress).
144. 83 F.C.C.2d at 293. In the 1980 depreciation order, the FCC did not forbid the use
of the vintage group method, but recommended that the equal life group method replace the
vintage group method whenever possible. Id.
145. See 92 F.C.C.2d 864 (1983). See also Brief of Intervenors Supporting Respondents at
10 n. 1, 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1984). The brief of the intervening telephone companies supporting
the FCC in the VSCC case provided the following comparison of the vintage year and equal
life methods:
For purposes of illustration, assume that a group of six telephone poles installed at
the same time has an average estimated life of two years, yielding a depreciation rate
of 50% a year under the vintage method. If the average actually comprises three
subgroups of two poles each, estimated to last one, two and three years respectively,
then a more accurate depreciation schedule would depreciate two poles at 100% for
one year, two poles at 50% a year for two years, and two poles at 33 1/3% for three
years; and this is what ELG does. In effect, ELG creates subgroups having estimated
equal lives of useful service, and a more precise measure of depreciation in each year
is produced.
Id.
146. See 83 F.C.C.2d at 279. In the 1980 depreciation order, the FCC did not specify how
the accuracy of the ELG method would differ from the VG method, except that the ELG
method would require more data in setting estimated asset service lives. Id. State regulatory
commissions argued that the use of the ELG method of depreciation does not provide a more
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tion147 that allows carriers to charge higher depreciation expenses in the early
years of an asset's depreciable life and lower expenses in later years.1
4 1
Consequently, greater depreciation allowance in the early years of asset
service results in lower federal income tax payments by the carriers. 49 The
lower tax payments are offset by increased tax payments in later years as
depreciation allowances are reduced. 50 The FCC stated that ELG provides a
better match of capital consumption with capital recovery than the VG
method of depreciation. 5 The FCC stated that ELG provides increased
capital for carriers in the form of deferred tax payments, and depending on
how carriers choose to use the increased capital, ELG may encourage
modernization of the communications network and competition. 52 The FCC
stated that since ELG increases a carrier's internally generated funds, carriers
may use the funds for investment or modernization. 53 If carriers use such
funds for modernization, ELG would not result in simply excess profit for
carriers, but would facilitate technological evolution in the communications
accurate matching of capital consumption with capital recovery. Id. Instead, the state commis-
sions asserted that the adoption of ELG amounts simply to granting carriers a rate increase
because of increased administrative costs. Id.
147. See PmLLps, supra note 132 at 201. Accelerated depreciation in calculating taxable
income allows a carrier to charge higher depreciation charges in the early years of an asset's
service life and lower depreciation charges in the waning years of asset service life. Id.; see also
KAHN, supra note 132 at 32-33. In effect, accelerated depreciation provides a carrier with an
interest-free loan during the initial period of tax deferral because a carrier receives higher rates
and more revenue than necessary to cover operating costs. Id. The real rate of return on
investment increases if a carrier keeps an increased percentage of profits for any period of time
before having to pay taxes to the government. Id. Consequently, carriers earn a higher rate of
return when allowed to retain an interest-free loan in the form of higher depreciation charges.
See id.; see also supra note 132 (discussing relationship between depreciation charges and
consumer rates).
148. See supra note 147 (describing tax deferral effect of accelerated depreciation).
149. See PsmL.ls, supra note 132 at 202; see also KAHN, supra note 132 at 33. As long as
total carrier assets increase, taxes paid by carriers under accelerated depreciation will always be
lower than under straight line depreciation. See KAnN, supra note 132 at 33. When a carrier
continues to make investments, the tax savings on new investments often will exceed the amount
of taxes due on prior investments. Id. Thus, accelerated depreciation can result in permanent
tax deferral for carriers at consumer expense due to higher rates to support new investments.
See id.
150. See supra note 147 (discussing timing of tax payments under accelerated depreciation).
151. 83 F.C.C.2d at 279. The FCC in its 1980 depreciation order did not explain how ELG
provides a better match of capital consumption with capital recovery than VG, but stated that
ELG would hinder the ability of carriers to provide efficient telephone service. Id. However,
the FCC acknowledged that use of the ELG method would result in an increase in consumer
rates. Id. The FCC also noted that the ELG method would result in an increased regulatory
burden and require an increase in staff. Id. The FCC speculated that ELG would encourage
modernization, but knew absolutely that ELG would increase rates and regulatory costs. See
id. Consequently, the FCC placed a greater emphasis on promoting the speculative goal of
modernization, and did not adequately consider the equally important goal of preserving
reasonable rates. See id.; see also infra note 194 (discussing FCC goals of providing efficient
service at reasonable cost).
153. See 83 F.C.C.2d at 279.
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industry.'5 Technological evolution in turn may result in greater efficiency
and in the utilization of equipment that increases productivity. 155 Therefore,
an excess in revenue generated by ELG may encourage carriers to invest in
new technology that promotes efficiency and productivity.
5 6
While consumers may benefit from savings on interest because of carrier
self-financing through ELG-generated funds, consumers also may pay higher
rates than necessary because ELG provides a carrier with capital in excess
of actual operating expenses.' 57 An excess of carrier revenue occurs when a
state regulatory commission includes as an operating expense higher federal
income taxes than a carrier actually is paying. 5 State regulatory commissions
consider federal taxes for a carrier as an operating expense, and calculate
that expense as if the carrier paid the federal income tax on a straight line
basis. 5 9 In reality, the carrier pays federal taxes according to an accelerated
depreciation rate, and consequently receives inflated operating expense credit
for paying more federal taxes than the carrier actually has paid. 6° Inflated
operating expenses result in rate increases that provide carriers with more
capital than necessary to meet actual operating expenses.' 6' The excess capital
154. See W. BOLTER & D. IRwiN, supra note 135 at 34. Depreciation reform such as use
of accelerated depreciation methods allows carriers to utilize excess revenue for the purpose of
new investment and modernization. Id. Modernization may enhance the competitive marketplace
through the retirement of obsolete equipment and the employment of new, more efficient
equipment. Id.
155. See W. BOLTER & D. IRwiN, supra note 135 at 34. New products and innovation
often lower the cost of services by providing greater efficiency. Id. Depreciation rates can
provide rewards and incentives to encourage carriers to invest in more productive technology.
Id.
156. Id.; see supra note 154 (describing relationship between excess revenue, modernization,
and efficiency).
157. See 83 F.C.C.2d at 284. The FCC recognized that the adoption of the ELG method
would increase consumer rates and carrier cash flow over and above that needed under the
vintage group method. Id.; see supra note 147 (describing relationship of ELG and increased
carrier cash flow).
158. See KAraN, supra note 132 at 32-33. Tax deferral does not reduce the total amount of
taxes paid, but defers the payment of taxes until a later time. Id. Tax deferral for a carrier
allows the carrier to keep more profits during the deferral period and in effect acts as an
interest-free loan. Id. at 33.
159. See Pmuarps, supra note 132 at 201. When state commissions include as operating
costs the higher income taxes carriers would pay under a straight line method, the carriers
receive the equivalent of an interest-free loan in the form of the difference between taxes
actually paid under accelerated depreciation, and taxes credited to operating expenses under the
straight line method. Id. at 201-202.
160. See supra notes 147 & 153 (describing excess funds that accrue to carriers under
accelerated depreciation).
161. See C. WILcox, PUBLIC POLICIES TowARD Busnwss 560-562 (1960). Regulated com-
panies do not necessarily gain an economic advantage by keeping operating expenses down. Id.
at 560. Inflated expenses can lead to higher profits and thus may result in higher salaries and
bonuses for carrier executives. See id. The consumer pays for inflated expenses through higher
rates. Id.
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generated by the difference between a carrier's federal tax payment calculated
according to straight line depreciation for ratemaking purposes, and the
actual tax payments calculated according to accelerated depreciation, accrues
to a tax reserve account. 6 2 Carriers may use the capital accrued to a tax
reserve account for payment of future taxes, investment, or other carrier
expenses. 63 The tax reserve account increases as long as a carrier continues
to invest in new equipment and tax deferrals for the new year exceed
payments on previous tax deferrals. 64 Carriers also may use the tax reserve
account as internally generated interest-free financing capital for further
investment. 65 However, excess capital accrued to the tax reserve account
often results from inflated operating expense estimations, and consequently
requires that consumers pay higher rates than necessary to provide carriers
with interest-free financing capital.
66
State regulatory commissions unanimously opposed the adoption of the
ELG method of depreciation. 67 The FCC acknowledged that the use of ELG
would result in increased regulatory burden and consequently in the need for
increased regulatory staff. 68 The FCC also acknowledged that the use of
162. See J. SuLFLOW, supra note 133 at 105-106. The tax reserve account is not required
in many states, but represents the accumulated depreciation earnings that a carrier may segregate
for use in later tax payments or may reinvest in other utility property. Id. Some states require
by statute that carriers maintain a separate depreciation account. Id. Carriers may use the
accumulated funds for depreciation expenses and for investment in new extensions or additions
to utility property. Id. at 106.
163. See supra note 162 (describing tax reserve account and its use).
164. See supra note 149 (discussing accelerated depreciation as resulting in permanent tax
deferral).
165. See supra notes 147 and 159 (discussing investment capital generated by accelerated
depreciation).
166. See supra note 147 (describing relationship between accelerated depreciation and
higher consumer rates); see also supra note 159 (describing relationship between inflated
operating expenses, and "interest-free financing" for carriers).
167. 83 F.C.C.2d at 278. Before making its 1983 depreciation ruling, the FCC received
comments from seven state regulatory commissions regarding ELG (California Public Utilities
Commission (PUC), Colorado PUC, Florida Public Service Commission (PSC), Kentucky PSC,
Maryland PSC, New York PSC, and Wisconsin PSC) and comments from the National
Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners (NARUC) subcommittee of staff experts
on accounting, the Southeastern Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (SEARUC),
and the Department of Defense. Id. All opposed the adoption of ELG. Id. The state commissions
stated that ELG would increase operating expenses and rates for consumers. Id. The NARUC
subcommittee stated that ELG, if adopted, should be mandatory only for large telephone
companies and should be elective for all other carriers. Id. at 279. The state commissions,
NARUC, SEARUC, and the Department of Defense also argued that the FCC had not
demonstrated the carriers' need for increased cash flow that ELG would provide. Id.
168. 83 F.C.C.2d at 279. The FCC in its 1980 depreciation order cited a study by the
accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst, Inc. Id. The FCC quoted the study as saying that the use of
the ELG method of depreciation would result in rate increases for consumers, more work for
regulators, and would require expansion of staff. See id.
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ELG would require state regulatory commissions to pay greater attention to
estimating an asset's depreciable life. 169 Consequently, the increased regula-
tory burden would result in hardship for smaller carriers because such carriers
often lack the necessary means and data to implement the more detailed
ELG method.
70
The ELG method of depreciation sets accelerated depreciation schedules
for assets according to specific groupings of assets at the beginning of an
asset's life.'7' The FCC noted that a problem results when the estimation of
asset life exceeds actual service life. 72 The FCC has stated that the primary
goal of the depreciation process is to distribute the entire cost of an asset in
a reasonable manner over an asset's service life. 73 The FCC previously used
the whole life method 74 as a final step in depreciation calculation to try to
avoid inaccurate estimations of depreciable life. 75 Inaccurate estimations of
depreciable life often result in equipment retirement before carriers receive
full depreciation recovery of the original capital investment. 76 The FCC
169. 83 F.C.C.2d at 284. Although the FCC admitted that the adoption of the ELG
method of depreciation would impose a greater burden on regulatory commissions and agencies,
the FCC noted that a greater precision in depreciation life estimation would result. Id.
170. Id. at 284-285. In evaluating the effect of the ELG method of depreciation on smaller
carriers, the FCC acknowledged that smaller carriers may lack the resources necessary to comply
with the implementation of the ELG method. Id. Thus, in 1982 the FCC stated that not all
carriers would be required by the FCC to follow the ELG method. Id. In 1983, however, the
FCC reversed this position and required all carriers to use either the ELG or remaining life
methods of depreciation. 92 F.C.C.2d 864 (1983).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 145-156 (discussing ELG method of depreciation).
172. See 83 F.C.C.2d at 288. In its 1980 order, the FCC described the problem created
when the estimation of asset life exceeds actual service life as a capital recovery problem for
carriers. Id. The FCC stated that when obsolescence shortens the life of an asset, a carrier fails
to recover the full capital investment in the asset. Id. The FCC concluded that less than full
capital recovery could stifle innovation and modernization because carriers would have less
available capital to invest. See id.
173. Id. at 294.
174. Id. at 289.
175. Id. at 288-89. In its 1980 depreciation order, the FCC noted that the whole life method
of depreciation charges consumers according to the pro rata share of the diminished value of
an asset. Id. at 289. The pro rata share is a straight line calculation and constitutes a depreciation
charge based upon actual service and not on a preference for full capital recovery. See id.
Under the whole life method of depreciation, consumers pay the portion of asset depreciation
expense that corresponds to the yearly loss of asset value as originally estimated. See id.
Consequently, consumers do not pay costs incurred by carriers in the past to make up for
carrier miscalculation of service lives, nor are consumers charged for projected future costs
through higher than necessary depreciation charges. See id. Therefore, under the whole life
method of depreciation consumers pay depreciation rates that reflect the present cost of service.
See id.
176. See infra note 177 (discussing less than full recovery of capital due to inaccurate
service life estimation).
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determined that the whole life method lacked the flexibility to adjust to
changing asset lives that might result from the introduction of new technol-
ogy.' 77 To counter the problem of less than full capital recovery through the
whole life method, the FCC proposed the use of the "remaining life"
method.1
78
When the depreciable life of an asset is shortened because of obsolesence
or other factors, the remaining life method allows a company to recover the
full amount of undepreciatea investment during the remaining useful life of
an asset. 179 In essence, the remaining life method allows carriers to recover
the entire amount of depreciation value of an asset over a shorter period of
time than originally estimated.8 0 Shortening the time frame for recovery of
177. 83 F.C.C.2d at 289-90. In a 1980 depreciation order, the FCC stated that the whole
life method of depreciation did not allow for full investment recovery because technological
developments of the 1970s shortened the estimated depreciable lives of newly obsolete assets.
Id. Because of asset obsolescence the FCC determined that the whole life method of depreciation
could result in underrecovery by carriers in their original asset investments. Id. For example, a
telephone pole installed in 1970 might have an estimated life of 20 years, depreciating at 5%
per year. In 1975, after one-fourth of the estimated life for the asset had elapsed, the new
revised total life estimate for the telephone pole might be 10 years. Under the whole life method,
the new depreciation rate would be set according to the new life estimate of 10 years, depreciating
at 10% per year, and applied for the last five years. When the telephone pole is retired at the
end of 1979, the depreciation recovery falls short of the cost of the asset. The total depreciation
at retirement equals 75% of the original cost, representing a 5% per year depreciation charge
from 1970 through 1974, and a 10% per year depreciation charge form 1975 through 1979.
While carriers would receive less than full capital recovery under the whole life method of
depreciation, depreciation charges would remain constant and would not increase rates. See id.;
see also infra note 180 (discussing whether carrier or consumer should bear risk of failing to
properly set depreciable life estimates).
178. 83 F.C.C.2d at 288-289; see infra note 179 (describing differences between remaining
life and whole life methods of depreciation).
179. 83 F.C.C.2d at 289. In describing the differences between the whole life and remaining
life depreciation rate calculations, the FCC in a 1980 depreciation order stated that the whole
life method attempts to set an annual charge that corresponds to the yearly diminishing of asset
value based on the carrier's original prediction of the asset's whole service life. Id. In contrast,
the remaining life method distributes asset cost over the current prediction of future asset life,
not the original whole service life estimate. Id. For example, a telephone pole installed in 1970
has an estimated life of 20 years, depreciating at five percent per year. In 1975, after one-fourth
of the estimated telephone pole life had elapsed, the new revised total life estimate changes
from 20 to 10 years. Under the remaining life method, a carrier increases the annual depreciation
charges of 5% per year to a depreciation charge of 15% per year form 1975 through 1979 in
order to recoup the remaining 75% of the original carrier investment. Cf. supra note 183
(explaining whole life depreciation method).
180. See 83 F.C.C.2d at 289. The FCC in its 1980 order stated that the remaining life
method of depreciation would allow carriers to accelerate capital recovery and consequently
increase depreciation charges in order to achieve full capital recovery. Id. Thus, if a carrier
shortened an asset's estimated service life, depreciation charges for the remaining years of the
asset's new estimated life would increase by whatever percentage necessary to provide the carrier
with full recovery of original capital investment. See id. The FCC anticipated sharp rate
increases resulting from the remaining life method because the FCC required that carriers
monitor the difference in rate increases under the remaining life method compared to the whole
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depreciation results in higher depreciation charges, which increase operating
expenses and consequently increase consumer rates.18 Thus, the remaining
life method results in full capital recovery for carriers, and increased rates
for consumers.
8 2
The FCC has stated that application of the remaining life method of
depreciation may result in sharp increases in revenue requirements and
consumer rates. 83 Operating expenses and rates increase because the use of
the remaining life method results in higher depreciation charges in the waning
years of an asset's life when the estimated service life of the asset has been
shortened by a carrier.'" The increase in revenue requirements and rates
results when carriers at their discretion shorten the depreciable life of an
asset and add increased depreciation charges to the revenue requirement to
recover the full capital investment within a shorter period of time.8 5 In
addition, the remaining life method may result in higher costs for future
customers because depreciation charges may increase dramatically when the
estimated life of an asset is shortened. 8 6 The increase in depreciation charges
life method. Id. at 290. The FCC stated that carriers should advise the FCC when an increase
in annual charges to the consumer of 115% or more result from the use of the remaining life
method, as compared to the whole life method. Id. Thus, the FCC conceded that application
of the remaining life method could result in sharp increases in consumer rates. See id.
181. See supra note 180 (discussing relationship between higher rates and remaining life
depreciation method).
182. See supra note 179 (describing how remaining life method of depreciation results in
full capital recovery); see also supra note 180 (discussing relationship between higher rates and
remaining life depreciation method).
183. 83 F.C.C.2d at 290 (1980); see supra note 180 (discussing relationship between higher
rates and remaining life depreciation method). The VSCC agreed, and estimated that as of
January 1, 1983, annual depreciation expenses charged to Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
company of Virginia customers under the remaining life method of depreciation would amount
to $110.73, compared to $87.90 under the whole life depreciation method. See Letter form
William Irby, Manager for Engineering, Depreciation and Network Planning for the Virginia
State Corporation Commission, Communications Division, to Donald E. Williams, Jr. (Septem-
ber 27, 1984) (discussing cost estimates for implementing remaining life method of depreciation)
(on file at Washingtion and Lee Law Review). The VSCC also estimated that for the same
period, annual depreciation expenses charged to customers of Continental Telephone Company
under remaining life would amount to $125.01, compared to $84.41 under the whole life method.
Id.
184. 83 F.C.C.2d at 290; see supra note 180 (discussing relationship between higher rates
and remaining life depreciation method).
185. See supra note 179 (describing how remaining life method results in full capital
recovery for carriers); see also supra note 180 (discussing relationship between higher rates and
remaining life method).
186. See Fox, The Remaining Life Depreciation Concept: A Regulator's View, 102 PuB.
UTIL. FORT. 19 (July 6, 1978). The remaining life method allows for substantial increases in
depreciation charges in order to compensate for shortened depreciable service lives. Id. at 20.
The increased depreciation charge reflects an expense that should have been distributed by
carriers in prior billing periods. Id. Consequently, future customers will bear the expense of a
carrier's failure to adequately estimate the service life of an asset. Id. At least one commentator
has stated that the risk of a depreciation recovery shortfall should fall on the carriers and
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increases operating expenses, which results in increased consumer rates. 8 7
The burden of paying for such depreciation expense then falls on customers
who pay a larger depreciation expense than previous customers for the same
asset. 8
The FCC-prescribed methods of depreciation, ELG and remaining life,
are binding upon state regulatory commissions in the Fourth Circuit as a
result of the VSCC decision. 8 9 In VSCC, the Fourth Circuit sought to
promote a uniform system of depreciation that would provide efficient
telephone service. 9' In examining ELG and the remaining life methods of
depreciation, the Fourth Circuit failed to note the drawbacks of the two
methods.' 91 While the newly prescribed depreciation methods do not assure
greater efficiency, both the VSCC and the FCC acknowledge that higher
rates for the consumer will result.-9 In considering the VSCC v. FCC case,
the Fourth Circuit weighed policy considerations such as FCC promotion of
an efficient, competitive communications system, 93 but the court failed to
weigh the impact of the new depreciation methods on the important policy
consideration of maintaining reasonable consumer rates. 94
shareholders, rather than on consumers. Id. at 21. Consumers do not devise service life estimates,
and therefore should not have to bear the burden of inaccurate estimates. Id. Conversely, other
commentators have stated that because the allowable rate of return for public utilities is
regulated and typically kept low for the benefit of consumers, consumers should share in the
risk of diminished capital recovery through depreciation if depreciation recovery shortfall
occurs. See KAHN, supra note 132 at 120.
187. See supra note 132 (describing relationship between depreciation, operating expenses,
and higher rates for consumers); see also supra note 134 (describing impact of higher operating
costs on increase in consumer rates).
188. See supra note 186 (discussing effect of remaining life method on future consumers).
189. See 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1984) (requiring state commissions to follow FCC prescribed
depreciation methods); see also supra note 123 (discussing authority of federal courts of appeal
to determine validity of FCC orders).
190. See 737 F.2d at 390.
191. Id. at 392; see Fox, The Depreciation Scapegoat: A Regulator's View, 108 PUB. UTn.
FORT. 48-49 (July 16, 1981). In evaluating the remaining life method of depreciation, one
commentator has stated that depreciable life estimates may suffer from speculation and bias.
Id. at 49. The same commentator noted that the ELG and remaining life methods of depreciation
may encourage carriers to make unwise or unnecessary investments in new equipment that may
harm cost effective management of telephone service. Id.
192. See 737 F.2d at 394 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that VSCC regarded FCC preemption
action as resulting in rate hike); see also 83 F.C.C.2d at 290 (FCC acknowledged new
depreciation methods would result in consumer rate hikes).
193. 737 F.2d at 394. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC stated that the FCC had a reasonable
basis for deciding to preempt state depreciation methods in order to promote the goals of
efficiency and competition through faster capital recovery. Id. Providing carriers with faster
capital recovery would encourage innovation through investment in new equipment, according
to the FCC. Id.
194. See id. at 392. The Fourth Circuit in VSCC quoted the Communications Act as
providing for the FCC the overriding goal of promoting a rapid, efficient communications
service. Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 151 (outlining general FCC policy goals). In its discussion in
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In failing to examine adequately the effect of FCC preemption of state
accounting and depreciation methods on the authority of state regulatory
commissions and consumer rates, the Fourth Circuit's VSCC decision con-
flicts with the statutory language of the Communications Act of 193495 and
with the legislative history of the Act. 96 The VSCC decision encourages but
does not guarantee plant modernization. 9 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit's
decision ensures an increase in consumer rates. 9s The VSCC decision results
in the denial of state regulatory commissions' authority over accounting and
depreciation methods, 9 9 deprives state commissions of ratemaking author-
ity,20° and effectively reaches a result contrary to the intent of Congress.
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VSCC, the Fourth Circuit failed to note that the same provision in the Communications Act
also states that the FCC should provide a communications system with adequate facilities at
reasonable charges. See 737 F.2d at 392; see also 47 U.S.C. § 151. Unlike the speculative nature
of the Fourth Circuit's assertion that state depreciation methods may inhibit innovation, both
parties agreed in VSCC v. FCC that consumer rates will increase because of the implementation
of FCC-prescribed depreciation methods. See 737 F.2d at 394. The FCC admits that its
depreciation methods may result in sharp increases in rates for consumers. See 83 F.C.C.2d at
290. The Fourth Circuit, however, failed to consider the effect of FCC depreciation methods
on consumer rates and consequently ignored an overriding FCC policy concern that supports
the continued regulation of depreciation methods by state commissions. See id. at 290.
195. See supra notes 3 and 119 (discussing statutory provisions in Communications Act
that support state regulation of depreciation methods).
196. See supra note 71 (discussing legislative history of Communications Act that support
state regulation of depreciation methods).
197. See Wscox, supra note 161 at 560-561. When managers of regulated companies have
excess capital, as would usually result under FCC depreciation methods, investment in new and
more efficient equipment or increases in salaries for carrier employees could result. See id. See
also Petition for Rehearing by Petitioners VSCC at 9, VSCC v. FCC, 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.
1984). Carriers with additional capital provided by the FCC's depreciation methods could use
the money for lobbying or for increased dividends to shareholders, which would not further
the FCC's goals of promoting efficiency or competition. See id.
198. See 737 F.2d at 394 (discussing FCC depreciation methods and VSCC opposition
because of resulting rate hikes); see also 83 F.C.C.2d at 290 (FCC acknowledged new deprecia-
tion methods would result in rate hikes); see also supra note 132 (describing relationship between
depreciation methods and higher rates for consumers).
199. See 737 F.2d at 392.
200. See id. at 399 (videner, J., dissenting); see also supra note 132 (describing relationship
between depreciation methods and higher rates for consumers).

